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In a Sept. 9 address before the Argentine Industrial Union, President Raul Alfonsin announced
plans for a diplomatic offensive aimed at reducing the social and economic burdens of servicing
the country's $53 billion foreign debt. He indirectly blamed his government's economic austerity
program for the ruling party's setback in the Sept. 6 midterm elections, and attacked the IMF for its
"ridiculous prescriptions which have nothing to do with the needs of the people."
Alfonsin added that his government had the moral authority to make demands to creditor banks
and multilateral institutions because it had been willing to pay a high political price for its economic
policies. "This is not a government that waited until after the elections to increase tariffs" in
the public sector, he said. In its election campaign, the Peronist Party focused its attacks on the
government's austerity program and called repeatedly for a temporary suspension of interest
payments on the debt to foreign banks. The Peronists won 16 of 22 gubernatorial races, while the
ruling Radical Civil Union Party lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
Alfonsin also announced that his economy minister, Juan Sourrouille, would stay on. In August,
Buenos Aires completed what were considered as highly successful debt negotiations. The
Argentine package was preceded by an IMF agreement completed in July. Last month, however,
Sourrouille told foreign bankers that "the problem of external debt has not been resolved" and said
some permanent formula must be found to replace the successive refinancing deals that have been
used to avert debt defaults in Latin America.
Some experts said that in the wake of Alfonsin's defeat, Argentina and Brazil can now be expected
to work more closely in pressing for a drastic revision in the way the region's debt problems are
handled. The first evidence of any joint campaign should be apparent at the annual meetings of
the IMF and the World Bank in Washington later this month. Nonetheless, the endorsement of
Sourrouille dampened speculation that the minister would be dismissed and that economic policy
would make a sharp turn to the left or the right. Senior members of the ruling Radical Civic Union
confirmed that while some adjustment measures are still likely, they will be carried out by the
government's existing economic team. Government sources also left open the possibility of changes
soon in other Cabinet posts.
As of Sept. 14, imminent changes in the interior, labor and social welfare portfolios were
expected. On Monday, US Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan telephoned Sourrouille to
congratulate him on his reconfir- mation as economy minister. Greenspan also reportedly conveyed
congratulations from US Treasury Secretary James Baker. According to the Washington Post, neither
Alfonsin's criticism of the multinational institutions nor his campaign to freeze interest rates were
new. But the force and bluntness with which both were expressed and the formal announcement of
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a diplomatic offensive had the apparent aim of relieving domestic pressure for some action on the
debt front.
Alfonsin fiercely defended his economic program against harsh criticism delivered in his presence
by Eduardo de la Fuente, UIA head, who complained of the absence of clear rules for investment.
Alfonsin said his administration has tried to make the economy more competitive by granting
special business credits, promoting exports, drafting regional development plans and starting to
sell off state-owned companies. He blamed the lack of progress so far on, among other things, the
foreign debt, a drop in prices for Argentine exports and the sheer difficulty of reversing a process of
decline that began decades ago.
But some economic analysts in Buenos Aires say Alfonsin is also partly to blame. He unwittingly
undercut public confidence in his own program with the decision earlier this year to name Carlos
Alderete, leader of the electrical workers' union, as minister of labor. [Alderete announced his
resignation early this week.] The appointment had represented an attempt by Alfonsin's Radical
Union advisers to forge an alliance with the so-called Group of 15, a large segment of Argentina's
powerful labor union movement. The political maneuver was supposed to facilitate wage pacts,
foster agreement on new labor legislation and co-opt some of the Peronist opposition.
Instead, analysts say, the move clouded the government's economic policy. The minister of labor
ended up quarreling openly with the minister of economy. Against this background, large wage
hikes were approved. The deficit grew to 6.5% of national output by mid-year, three points above
target. Monthly inflation soared into double digits in July and reached 13.7% last month. As
credibility in the government's economic management fell, the flight of Argentine australs into US
dollars quickened, causing the black market exchange rate to shoot more than 40% ahead of the
official rate. (Basic data from WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES, 09/11/87; AFP, PRENSA
LATINA, 09/14/87)
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